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Marketing Strategy in Britain’s Mainline Railways, 1923–38 
 
 
Historians have long regarded Britain’s railway companies in the interwar period as by and large 
devoid of  commercial acumen. Aldcroft, Dyos, Savage and Channon are among those who saw the 
railways as failing to adjust to the changing economic and business environment (Dyos and Aldcroft, 
1969; Savage, 1959; Pollins, 1971; Crompton, 1985). Channon wrote that the railway companies had 
little understanding of  the need to conceive ‘an approach to strategy that focused on marketing’ 
(Channon, 2001, p. 50). Even for relatively mild critics such as Bonavia, the railways only started to 
address commercial policy issues, if  at all, from around 1930 when the commercial lethargy of  
railway companies became the target of  severe criticism by the 1931 Royal Commission on Transport 
(Bonavia, 1978). But even then, according to the existing accounts, their commercial efforts remained 
superficial and half-hearted. This article challenges this largely accepted view, and instead argues that 
the railway companies were far from lagging behind in the growing field of  transport marketing. 
Rather, the available records suggest that the railway companies of  the interwar period can be viewed 
as sufficiently marketing conscious business organisations.  
A reassessment of  railway marketing during the interwar period requires an explanation 
that accounts for both the relatively advanced position of  railway marketing and the decline of  rail 
travel in the interwar period. The chief  cause for the relative decline of  the railways’ passenger 
business was clearly the intense inter-modal competition (Barker, 1986). However, the conventional 
account of  the railways’ loss of  passenger business scarcely incorporated marketing as a factor 
affecting the industry’s business performance. It has generally been assumed that the condition of  
the passenger business is dependent upon exogenous elements such as the economic condition, or 
simply the necessity to move (Preston, 2001). Hence the alleged failure of  the railways’ commercial 
policy has been identified as an insufficient response to market demand, rather than a failure of  
proactive policy. Such an argument is a retrogressive evaluation of  the situation, in which the decline 
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of  relative market share is supposed to indicate absence of  marketing strategy (Aldcroft, 1968, pp. 
63–64). There is an alternative scenario. There was a marketing strategy that worked, but it had a 
limited impact on the railways’ passenger business, which was not enough to redeem the passenger 
business as a whole. The latter argument fits with historians’ recent research into the railways’ 
publicity work. As a series of  studies have demonstrated, railway publicity in the interwar period was 
highly sophisticated commercial propaganda (Bennett, 2000; Divall, 2011; Harrington, 2004; Medcalf, 
2011; Thompson, 2012; Watts 2004). Both the quantity and quality of  the interwar railways’ publicity 
material seems to confirm the claim of  these scholars that the railways were adept advertisers. Then 
how can this be compatible with the decline of  passenger business? This unresolved question points 
to our insufficient understanding of  the comprehensive business context within which railway 
publicity was created and consumed, and the link between railway marketing and the business 
performance of  the railway companies.  
The following sections address three topics related to marketing of  the railways during the 
interwar period: organisation of  marketing, advertising expenditure and marketing alliances. The aim 
of  these examinations is not just to elaborate on developments within the railway industry. In spite 
of  the growing popularity of  marketing history, we have only limited knowledge of  how institutional 
marketing was conducted in the early twentieth century, especially in Britain. At the same time, due to 
marketing history’s traditional focus on commodity marketing, we are only beginning to understand 
the corresponding marketing development in the service sector in the early twentieth century (Corley, 
1987, p. 65; Church, 2000; L’Etang, 2004; Heller, 2016a and 2016b; Schwarzkopf, 2012). The recent 
scholarly attention to service marketing calls for a revision of  the development of  Britain’s transport 
business (Heller, 2010; Gladden, 2014; Pirie 2012). This paper aims to contribute to the growing 
literature on the history of  consumer service marketing by examining one of  the biggest industries in 
interwar Britain. As the discussion chiefly concerns the consumer market, its main focus is railways’ 
passenger business.  
The first topic to be discussed is organisation: how railways’ marketing was organised in 
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terms of  a corporate structure. This also entails the personnel involved in railway marketing, and 
their work. These considerations reveal that the railway companies clearly recognised the strategic 
value of  marketing, and the same recognition becomes apparent in an examination of  a series of  
re-organisations from the late 1920s. The railway companies’ marketing strategy appeared in terms of  
financial calibration. At a time when marketing functions were yet to be clearly defined in business 
corporations, advertising expense is the closest, though incomplete, financial data we have for seeing 
how much the interwar railway companies invested in marketing. The railway companies’ allocation 
of  advertising expenditure reflects the wider commercial strategy regarding their passenger business. 
The next question is how did the marketing strategy appear in terms of  sales? A case study is drawn 
from industry-wide marketing activity, mostly appearing in a nascent form of  marketing alliances 
among the railway companies, such as joint marketing through coordinated service introductions and 
sales efforts. 
 By examining the railways’ marketing orientation in three areas, this article demonstrates 
the railway industry’s relatively advanced position in terms of  its willingness to adopt various 
marketing techniques in the contemporary business context. It also re-connects railway marketing 
and the railways’ passenger business more broadly. Rather than separating railway marketing from the 
decline of  railway business, the railway companies’ marketing efforts during the interwar period can 
be better understood as the industry’s response to its loss of  business chiefly caused by the 
inter-modal competition from road traffic. Such an understanding enables an alternative 
interpretation of  the railway business during the interwar period, addressing the seemingly 
contradictory views of  existing studies on Britain’s railways in a period that has been regarded as both 
the golden age of  railway advertising and, at the same time, a period characterised by the railways’ 
un-enterprising commercial policy. 
The main primary sources for this article are drawn from the archives of  the mainline 
railway companies’ business records held in the National Archives, UK. As the article focuses on the 
formative period of  railway marketing, when the marketing organisation for each company was still 
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fluid, the companies’ internal records relating to marketing can only be found scattered across 
different sections of  the companies. There are two exceptions. The first is the Railway Clearing 
House’s (RCH) meetings conducted with advertising and publicity representatives, which took place 
throughout the interwar period as a forum for industry-level discussions on marketing policy and 
operations. Second is the Great Western Railway (GWR) in which passenger marketing was discussed 
by the Traffic Committee and presented in the Annual Report of  the Traffic Department. Records 
are less consistent regarding the marketing work in the London Midland and Scottish Railway (LMS), 
the London & North Eastern Railway (LNER) and the Southern Railway (SR). Occasional reviews 
and situation reports of  their marketing developments, such as the LNER’s report on advertising 
organisation (LNER, 1923) and the LMS’s 1929 report on publicity arrangements (LMS, 1929a), are 
invaluable historical records of  marketing in these companies. Of  particular importance is the 
LNER’s advertising expenditure, reconstructed in Table 1, based on the company’s internal accounts 
(RAIL 400/64–73). Hughes (1990) in his study on the LNER, located only aggregate figures of  
advertising expenditure for the years 1924 and 1929 (Hughes, 1990, p. 131). Table 1 of  this article 
provides the details of  expenditure—the original 59 items were grouped into 13 categories—allowing 
us to look more closely into the company’s financial control on marketing activity.  
The railway companies’ business records are supplemented by the railway companies’ staff  
journals. Originating in the 1880s, the publication of  staff  journals became a common practice in the 
railway industry by the early twentieth century. In the interwar period, all four mainline companies 
had their house journals: GWR Magazine, LMS Magazine, LNER Magazine and Southern Railway 
Magazine. Toward the end of  the 1920s, topics related to marketing began to feature in these journals 
regularly as railway marketers employed the media not just to report on their work but also to 
cultivate employee loyalty and nurture a culture of  salesmanship among all levels of  the company 
workforce. For example, LNER Magazine ran a regular feature called ‘Advertising Notes’, starting in 
December 1928, written by the company’s advertising manager C. G. Dandridge (LNER, 1928b, pp. 
630–631). Together with the railway industry’s chief  publication, Railway Gazette, railway staff  
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 5
journals contain a wealth of  information concerning railway marketing. 
 
The Business of  Railways in Interwar Britain 
Britain’s railway companies, about 120 of  which existed before the First World War, were 
consolidated into four group companies by the Railways Act of  1921. The ‘grouping’ created four 
massive commercial organisations, known as the Big Four: the LMS, LNER, GWR and SR. The Big 
Four companies inherited a business that was suffered by major problems. The frenetic development 
of  railway construction in the nineteenth century led to the creation of  an inefficient network. In 
1923, Britain’s railway lines stretched over 20,334 miles and contained a number of  infrastructure 
duplications. For instance, inter-city traffic that connected London with Exeter, Plymouth, 
Birmingham and Manchester had two to four routes (Haywood, 2009, p. 21). Route duplication often 
entailed overinvestment in facilities such as passenger stations and goods depots. The interwar period 
saw some reduction of  line mileage with 1,200 miles of  railway lines closed between 1923 and 1938; 
line closures were concentrated in the early 1930s, when over 200 miles were trimmed from the 
network each year (Loft, 2006; Patmore, 1966). Although the closures addressed duplication and 
over-provision to some extent, their scope was usually limited to the withdrawal of  particularly 
unremunerative services. The companies rarely had sufficient capital to rationalise their network 
(Patmore, 1966, pp. 114–117). The direct cause of  the railway industry’s financial hardship was the 
First World War, which left companies with a considerable backlog of  repairs and maintenance after 
the extensive use of  the railway system under wartime government control. The £60 million 
compensation from the government was hardly enough to recover the railways from war damage, let 
alone to modernise their fleet and tracks. Most of  the gross railway investment of  £238 million 
during the interwar years was cancelled out by depreciation and replacement of  the companies’ assets 
(Bonavia, 1978, p. 77). Under the circumstance, network upgrading was equally limited. In 1938, only 
5.3% of  Britain’s rail tracks were electrified, and electrification was mostly confined to the south of  
the Thames by the Southern Railway (Foreman-Peck and Millward, 1994, p. 246). Furthermore, 
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despite the expectations of  the Ministry of  Transport, the grouping did not eliminate inter-firm 
competition. Rivalry between railway companies continued for some routes, notably for 
Anglo-Scottish traffic (Butterfield, 1986, 24–26). Britain’s mainline companies had to face intensifying 
competition from road traffic with heavy burdens that carried over from their predecessors. 
From the turn of  the twentieth century, the supposedly oligopolistic position of  the 
railways had already started to become threatened both by the introduction of  electric trams, and 
after the war, by rapidly growing road traffic (Barker, 1986; Barker and Gerhold, 1993; Bagwell, 1988; 
Scott, 2002). Figure 1 shows the general trend of  railways’ passenger revenue. Although the initial 
drop in 1926—mostly attributed to the General Strike—was considerable, the subsequent reduction 
of  passenger receipts was halted after the 1932 trough (LMS, 1946; Crompton, 1985, pp. 230–231). 
Apart from the negative impact of  the strike on passenger traffic, the railway companies interpreted 
the initial decline of  their passenger business as resulting from road competition. The LNER’s report 
of  1927 pointed out that where direct competition with motorbus services existed, there was as 
much as a 90 per cent reduction of  traffic, and the diminished traffic was inversely related to the 
increase in motorbus traffic (LNER, 1927). Similarly, the Railway Companies’ Association stated that 
15 per cent of  the total 17.3 per cent decline in passenger receipts between 1923 and 1930 was due to 
road competition, both from the motorbus and the private car (RCA, 1932). 
 
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
 
Figure 1. Big Four Passenger Revenue, 1924–1938 
Source: TNA, RAIL 398/42–55 
 
 The railway companies tried to meet the road competition by lowering passenger fares and 
introducing various reduced price tickets, but such a strategy was naturally accompanied by a decline 
in receipts per unit (GWR, 1924; Barker and Gerhold, 1993, p. 67). This price strategy also needs to 
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 7
be considered in conjunction with the fact that the railways’ passenger business had already been 
taking the low-margin, high-volume business model from the last quarter of  the previous century, 
through the opening up of  long-distance services to third class passengers, and the abolition of  
second class travel (Freeman, 1988, p. 47; Smith, 1988, pp. 62, 66–67). Consequently, by the interwar 
period, the major part of  passenger revenue came from third class passenger traffic. In addition to 
the low-margin, high-volume service orientation, a significant change in passenger revenue occurred 
around 1930. This was the clear shift of  the chief  revenue source from standard fares to reduced 
fares (Bonavia, 1978, pp. 69–71). Reduced fares in this article refer to the types of  ticket with fares 
lower than the ‘full-fare’, including excursion tickets and the tourist ticket.1 The so-called workmen’s 
ticket and season ticket are excluded from the discussion of  this article, as their shares in the railways’ 
revenue were small, and they were fairly constant throughout the period (Hughes, 1990, p. 173). As 
clearly seen in the passenger receipts on the Big Four companies, the share of  reduced fares 
surpassed that of  the full-fare from 1930, and the former grew constantly during the remainder of  
the interwar period (Figure 2). 
 
Insert Figure 2 About Here 
 
Figure 2. Big Four Passenger Receipts by Ticket Type, 1923–1937 
Source: Railway Returns, various years 
 
  Whether the railways’ reduced fare policy was effective in compensating for lost traffic is 
debatable, but the policy is indicative of  the existence of  the railway companies’ focused marketing 
policy. The introduction of  reduced fares was accompanied by substantial publicity so as to make the 
new arrangement known to the public (LNER, 1930, p. 390). At the same time, reduced fares were 
usually accompanied by certain restrictions, for example, on the route, timing, and period of  validity, 
all of  which required an extra flow of  information to the customers (The Times, 1923; The Times, 
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1927; Aldcroft, 1968, p. 40; LNER, 1929, p. 231). This naturally called for extra marketing effort. As 
such, the change in revenue structure was likely to have been supported by marketing organisation. 
 
Railways’ Marketing Organisation 
Many of  Britain’s railway companies had an advertising department from at least the last quarter of  
the nineteenth century. In the early years of  rail travel promotion, the advertising function was firstly 
placed directly under the General Managers, as it was mostly about choosing appropriate advertising 
agents and making orders for print notices (Shin, 2014, pp. 191–192; Wilson, 1970, pp. 19–21). When 
the need for advertising increased, the office of  the Superintendent of  the Lines, which could 
respond to the change of  services quickly, generally came to assume the function. From around the 
1890s and 1900s, the specialisation of  advertising led to the setting up of  dedicated advertising, or 
publicity, departments in many companies. These new departments became increasingly independent 
from the operational side of  the company, and accordingly, their work became more imaginative and 
technical (Shin, 2014, pp. 196–199). The marketing sections of  the Big Four were direct descendents 
of  these departments. A certain degree of  continuity from prewar railway advertising is clear with 
regard to the LMS, the largest of  the Big Four. In March 1923, T. C. Jeffrey, the former 
Superintendent of  Advertising on the Midland Railway, was appointed Superintendent of  Advertising 
and Publicity of  the LMS (Cole and Durack, 1992, p. 12). Jeffrey’s post was initially placed under the 
General Superintendent’s Department at Derby, and the company soon recognised that separating 
publicity work from their headquarters was not the most effective arrangement; hence the 
Advertising Department was transferred to Euston in 1925, placing it under the direct supervision of  
the General Manager (Railway Magazine, 1926, p. 78; Railway Gazette, 1923, p. 426). 
 The early advertising work of  the LNER, Britain’s second largest railway company, was also 
led by a career railway advertiser. The LNER’s first Advertising Manager, W. M. Teasdale, came from 
the North Eastern Railway, where he had been the Trade Advertising Agent and, from 1920, 
Advertising Manager (Middleton, 2002, p. 13; North Eastern Railway, 1921, p. 18). As with other 
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companies, the policymaking of  the LNER’s advertising functions was fairly concentrated, and the 
Advertising Manager was responsible for overseeing advertising policy across all the company’s 
territories, from issuing advertisements and controlling expenditure and freight advertising (LNER, 
1923). The LNRE’s Advertising Department had, apart from its head office in London, three area 
offices in Southern, North Eastern, and Scottish areas. Teasdale travelled between these offices, 
directing regional advertising clerks. 
 In terms of  company structure, the GWR was the company which most firmly maintained 
continuity in its corporate structure, including its Publicity Department within the General Manager’s 
Office. However, with regards to its personnel, the GWR was not averse to introducing new blood. 
Unlike Jeffrey and Teasdale, William Henry Fraser had no experience in pre-war railway advertising 
when he was appointed as the GWR’s Publicity Agent in 1924 (GWR, 1943, p. 62). Since he started 
working for the pre-war GWR in 1892, he spent most of  his career in the company’s engineering 
department. It was only at the outset of  the First World War that Fraser came to the field of  publicity 
as the Publicity Officer for the Railway Executive Committee. The circumstance of  his career change 
is unclear, but a possible explanation lies in his family connections: Fraser was the younger brother 
of  a journalist, Lovat Fraser who contributed to The Times and other newspapers (The Times, 1926). It 
is highly likely that his appointment was based upon his personal connection with the press. In fact, 
the GWR’s keenness to maintaining strong ties with the press was shown by the establishment of  a 
Press Bureau in 1923 under the Superintendents of  the Line, which was said to be the first of  its kind 
in the railway industry (GWR, 1923; Wilson, 1970, p. 46). Another example of  the GWR’s 
connection with the press is the company’s employment of  journalist Geo E. Beer. Beer was the 
news editor of  The Times between 1914 and 1920, and after the war, worked on ‘propaganda’ for the 
GWR before returning to journalism as the editor of  the Daily Mail in 1924 (Pole, 1968, pp. 84–85; 
The Times, 1938). While the LMS and LNER relied on experienced advertising managers for directing 
the newly established publicity departments, the GWR cultivated personal connections with relative 
newcomers to railway advertising in order to build up its publicity work. 
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 10
 The grouping negatively affected advertising organisation on the SR. The setting up of  a 
publicity section was delayed until October 1923, with the delay resulting in the establishment of  two 
departments dealing with the same function divided by geographical areas. Sectional differences soon 
became indistinctive, but SR publicity in the immediate postwar period was far from commendable 
(Cole and Durack, 1992, pp. 10–11). This changed around 1924, when criticism of  the SR’s suburban 
services was at its height (Bonavia, 1987, pp. 62–63). Herbert Walker, the SR’s General Manager 
employed a young journalist, John Elliot, who had worked for The New York Times in the United 
States, and the Daily Express and the Evening Standard in Britain (Elliot, 1982, p. 16; SR, 1933, p. 322). 
On the appointment of  Elliot as Public Relations and Advertising Assistant to the General Manager, 
the former two publicity sections were merged into one. The SR’s publicity section was then 
effectively centralised, with indoor and outdoor sections, and a Press Information Bureau (Elliot, 
1928, p. 167; Lamb, 1926, Fig. 1). The SR’s publicity took root in a similar fashion to the GWR, by 
recruiting an outsider to lead its publicity. Unlike Beer of  the GWR, Elliot remained in the industry, 
successfully establishing himself  in the company (Harrison and Moloney, 2004, p. 209). 
As the railway companies became keenly aware of  the significant effect of  the rise of  road 
transport from the mid-1920s, a series of  reorganisations were conducted by most of  the Big Four 
companies. Until then, whether maintaining the continuity in personnel (LMS and LNER) or 
accepting outsiders (SR and GWR), the early advertising policy of  the Big Four was based on the 
skills, experience and ingenuity of  individual advertising managers. This was, in a sense, an old model 
of  marketing, dating back to the period when railway managers dominated the selling side of  the 
business and little effort was made to systemise marketing. However, in the late 1920s, this started to 
change. In 1927, the LMS’s publicity policy changed with the retirement of  T. C. Jeffrey, who was 
succeeded by G. H. Loftus Allen, with his experience of  freight services on the continent and in the 
US, which presumably involved the development of  traffic (LMS, 1927, p. 240; Ellis, 1970, p. 47). 
Together with Allen’s appointment, the LMS obtained the service of  Sir Charles Higham, one of  the 
most influential advertising agents at the time, who was taken on to advise on the company’s 
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publicity (LMS 1929b). In the following year, 1928, the LNER went through a re-organisation by 
attaching the Press Section to the General Manager's Office: this reorganisation created a new post, 
that of  Information Agent to deal with public relations. The LNER’s re-organisation, like the LMS 
case, coincided with the departure of  the former chief  of  Advertising, Teasdale, who was promoted 
to the Chief  General Manager in 1927. The post of  the head of  the Advertising Department went to 
an ex-Great Central man, C. G. Dandridge who had a varied railway career in France, Russia and 
Turkey during the war (Middleton, 2002, p. 14; LNER, 1928a, p. 106). Dandridge further boosted the 
company’s publicity work, including, for example, making a regular contribution to the company 
magazine publicising the Department’s work, as well as familiarising the workforce with the idea of  
railway marketing (LNER, 1928b, p. 630). This reorganisation also shows the growing importance of  
public relations in railway companies, though the separation of  advertising/publicity and public 
relations was by no means typical of  railway companies of  the time. 
In 1930, the SR also undertook reorganisation, in that the responsibility of  running the 
trains and procuring traffic came under the control of  a Traffic Manager, E. C. Cox (SR, 1930a, p. 90; 
Bonavia, 1987, pp. 34–35). Elliot was appointed Assistant to the Traffic Manager—an old fashioned 
name for a marketing assistant, as Elliot later explained—dealing with the development of  traffic 
(Elliot, 1982, p. 43). The responsibility of  Elliot’s post covered ‘procuring passenger, freight, parcels 
and miscellaneous traffic, and will take steps to develop the traffic’ as well as control the company’s 
direct sales force (SR, 1930b, p. 200). Compared to other companies, the GWR’s approach was 
cautious, though not entirely conservative. Each of  Fraser’s two successors—K. W. C. Grand and G. 
E. Orton—had spent a few years in the US as the company’s General Agent, dealing with the 
company’s overseas promotion (Wilson, 1970, pp. 31–32; GWR, 1929a, p. 165). In 1932, Grand took 
over Fraser’s post on the latter’s retirement. In the following year, the post of  Commercial Assistant 
to the Superintendent of  the Line was created and Grand was duly appointed. In 1934, Orton 
followed a similar career path, from the Publicity Agent to the Commercial Assistant. It is not clear 
what the experience in the US gave to the two GWR Publicity Agents, but the trajectories of  the 
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career of  the two men suggests the GWR’s growing awareness of  marketing to a wider audience, 
including overseas customers. This reading of  the situation fits with the appointment of  Orton’s 
successor in 1934. The GWR recruited the former chief  of  outdoor publicity for the Empire 
Marketing Board, M. J. M. Dewar (GWR, 1934a, p. 419). In sum, the GWR’s chief  publicity officers 
after 1932 were consistently those who had some experience in overseas marketing, showing that the 
GWR embraced one of  the most forward-looking personnel policy with regards to its marketing 
section. To a varying degree and means, all the Big Four went through reconfiguration of  their 
marketing functions, and with this, the scope of  railway marketing was extended.  
 We do not know how intentionally the above mentioned marketing section of  the SR was 
created. By contrast, the LMS’s commercial section was clearly based on the idea of  marketing. 
Instigated by the Vice President Ernest Lemon, in 1932, the LMS Board decided to place its entire 
commercial operation under the control of  an independent Chief  Commercial Manager, in order to 
‘produce a really saleable article, and for the sales effort in respect of  all descriptions of  transport 
provided by the Company’ (LMS, 1940; LMS, 1946, p. 16; Jenkins, 2011, pp. 66–67). At the same time, 
the company’s direct sales section—known at the time as ‘canvassing’—came under the Chief  
Commercial Manager. Not only did traffic canvassers come to work in the new section, a 
Commercial Research Section was established in October of  the following year to conduct research 
into commercial aspects of  all types of  rail traffic. This was described by the company as ‘an entirely 
new feature in British railway administration’ (LMS, 1940). In 1934, the LMS’s territory was divided 
into 35 districts and various information was assembled for the Research Section (LMS, 1946, p. 16). 
Ashton Davies, the company’s Chief  Commercial Manager, stated that the LMS was conducting 
detailed statistical traffic analyses including some sort of  demand forecasting, and its excursion 
programmes were related to the densities of  population, general spending power, and to the distance 
between industrial areas and pleasure resorts (Davis, 1934). 
 This re-organisation series goes against Bonavia’s claim that the railway companies only 
started to address the allegedly lethargic commercial policy in the early 1930s (Bonavia, 1978, pp. 
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54–55). As shown above, in the late 1920s, their commercial policy had already started to show signs 
of  change. These organisational changes were not innovations that entirely originated in the railway 
industry: public relations, marketing departments and market research were previously adopted by 
other industries. Nevertheless, the early accommodation of  a set of  innovations contrasts sharply 
with the traditional image of  the railways’ ‘conservative and unenterprising’ commercial policy (Dyos 
and Aldcroft, 1969, p. 329).  
 Situating the railways’ marketing in relation to other industries casts light on the relative 
degree of  development in railway marketing. Most especially, a comparison with some public utility 
companies is revealing of  its contemporary standing. For instance, from the first decade of  the 
twentieth century, gas companies embraced the importance of  advertising and publicity. Since 1903, 
Francis Goodenough had been worked as Controller of  Gas Sales, a position that dealt with 
marketing, for the Gas Light and Coke Company (GLCC). When Goodenough was appointed to this 
position, the gas companies started to face competition from the new source of  energy, electricity, 
which was slowly but steadily gaining ground (Clendinning, 2002, p. 117). The situations of  the gas 
industry and that of  the interwar railway industry were fairly similar, in the sense that both of  them 
faced significant competition from newcomers: the gas industry faced competition from electricity, 
and the railways was struggling to compete with the motor car. The difference between the gas 
companies and railways was that, until the 1930s, the former group chiefly relied on outside agencies 
for its advertising and public relations while railway companies had long been internalised their 
marketing work. It is true that, from 1912, the gas industry had developed an industry-wide publicity 
group, the British Commercial Gas Association, but the GLCC used the London Press Exchange 
until it established its own Publicity Department in 1931 (Clendinning, 2002, pp. 123–124). The 
GLCC’s head of  publicity was A. P. Ryan who came from the Empire Marketing Board. Although 
this appointment was made three years before Dewar came to the GWR, for the extent of  corporate 
level adoption of  marketing, the railway companies were by no means running behind even the gas 
industry. 
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 14
 Indeed, the railways’ use of  market research shows the relatively advanced position of  the 
industry in terms of  marketing technique. Compared to the United States, where, from the 1910s, 
public opinion polls and market research were conducted by organisations like Gallup and the Curtis 
Publishing Company, British firms generally lagged behind (Jeremy, 1998, p. 486; Marchand, 2011, p. 
86). American manufacturers such as Coca-Cola and General Motors had already seen the value of  
market research and incorporated it into their corporate organisation and strategy by the 1920s. 
However, as Schwarzkopf  has demonstrated, the gap between British and American marketing was 
not as wide as previously thought. For instance, J. Walter Thompson agency (JWT) conducted 
large-scale market research for Liver Brothers during the 1920s, and by 1930 the company had 
established the in-house advertising group that eventually became Lintas (Schwarzkopf, 2009; Sharpe 
1964). JWT also assisted Rowntree, which also came to have its own research departments, 
employing market testing techniques between 1933 and 1936 (Dickinson, 1928, p. 7; Fitzgerald, 1995, 
pp. 31–32). Similarly, the BBC set up a Listener Research Department from 1936 (Jeremy, 1998, pp. 
479, 486; Moser, 1949). The LMS’s Research Department, established in 1932, was among these 
earliest practitioners of  market research in Britain. 
 The organisation of  railway marketing and its series of  reorganisation reveal the fairly high 
level of  sophistication of  railway marketing, with its openness to organisational innovation and 
marketing techniques. At the same time, the railway companies carefully selected suitable personnel 
to lead their marketing sections. At the organisational level, therefore, the railways’ incorporation of  
marketing in their commercial policy is fairly apparent. Then the question is whether the railways’ 
marketing organisation worked efficiently? The administration of  marketing needed to achieve results 
with an eye to effective—which usually meant economical—marketing with the maximum possible 
impact on sales. Both objectives involved the strategic allocation of  resources, which chiefly meant 
controlling expenditure. The following section examines the financial calibration of  railway 
marketing. 
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Financial Control over Railway Marketing 
Owing to the lack of  data and the idiosyncrasy of  itemisation in railway accounting; there is no 
complete data series showing the comparative publicity expenses of  all the Big Four companies. 
Possibly the most consistent record of  advertising expenditure is that of  the GWR’s advertising 
budget, which covers the entire interwar period. The company’s advertising budget shows that its 
annual total advertising budget had kept around the £100,000 mark, representing 1.17 per cent of  
passenger receipts in 1927. The GWR was not the largest spender in railway advertising, however. In 
the same year, the LNER and the LMS spent £264,604 and £264,006 respectively on advertising, 
equivalent to 2.16% and 1.39% of  their passenger receipts (LMS, 1929a).  
 In Kaldor and Silverman’s analysis of  contemporary press advertising across Britain’s 
industries in 1935, the service sector in general was underrepresented. While manufacturers’ spending 
was estimated at £46 million and retailers’ £9.7 million, accounting for 52% and 10.9% of  the total, 
service advertising (including that of  real estate and financial services) accounted for around £13 
million, a 14.5% share in national spending on press advertising (Kaldor and Silverman, 1948, p. 10). 
Although the significance of  the transport sector in service marketing was acknowledged—40% of  
service advertising came from the ‘travel and transport’ industry—press advertising alone is an 
insufficient indicator of  the scale of  railway marketing. In railway marketing, press notices were 
supplemented by guidebooks and timetables. Popular guidebooks were an effective marketing tool, 
and they were often cost-effective too. The GWR’s guidebook Holiday Haunts, which circulated 
200,000 annually, consistently brought in more than £14,000 to the company throughout the 1930s, 
when the GWR’s total expenditure on printing publications and posters was arou d £24,000 per 
annum (GWR, 1930, p. 33). The ability of  railway companies to advertise their own services at 
numerous railway stations also needs to be taken into account. Station advertisements were a source 
of  revenue. In 1935, public transport operators were making £2.2 million from their commercial 
advertising (Kaldor and Silverman, 1948, p. 15). Although the figure is a national aggregate, the 
railway companies could probably subsidise their own advertising expenditure from the revenue 
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arising from their advertising service for other industries. 
Compared with consumer goods advertising, the scale of  railway advertising appears 
relatively small. Indeed, some of  the manufacturers of  tangible goods were spending enormous sums 
on advertising, for example, the tobacco manufacturer, Player & Sons was spending more than 
£600,000 annually in the 1930s (Hilton, 2000, p. 94). However, this does not drastically change the 
relative importance of  railway publicity. Already in the late 1920s, the LMS, LNER and GWR were 
spending £60,000 to £120,000 on press advertising, sums equal to the press advertising spending of  
companies such as Austin, Morris, Shell, Prudential and the BCGC a decade later (GWR, 1934b; 
LMS, 1929a; Statistical Review of  Press Advertising).  
Generally speaking, in the railway industry, financial control through budgetary planning was 
yet to be widely adopted (Quail, 1996, p. 165). Advertising was a fairly exceptional case in this regard. 
In the case of  the LNER, the annual advertising budget was divided into two broad headings of  
‘fixed’ expenditure and ‘fluctuating’ expenditure. The items related to excursions and special trains 
came under the latter heading. By 1938, the advertising budget headings consisted of  about 70 items 
and, at the end of  the financial year, these headings were subjected to detailed analysis, while the ratio 
of  advertising expenditure to traffic receipts was calculated for each item. These analyses provided 
the basis for the following year’s advertising budget (Dandridge, 1938, p. 237; LNER, 1930, p. 389). 
There is also evidence to show that the LNER’s Advertising Department used the excursion traffic 
returns for allocating advertising expenditure (LNER, 1925). The existence of  budgetary control 
strongly suggests that railway advertising was a dynamic field of  business strategy, rather than 
something subordinate to the operation of  train service. In 1926, Teasledale stated that the monthly 
statement of  passenger bookings was ‘of  extremely great value from the advertising point of  view’ 
(LNER, 1925). 
In fact, the LNER’s allocation of  advertising expenditure did change in response to the 
business conditions (Table 1). The impact of  the Depression is apparent in the drop in most items of  
the advertising expenditure in 1930, except for press, resorts, overseas and maritime advertising. This 
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suggests that the LNER tried to weather the storm by promoting tourism, particularly that from 
overseas. But in 1931, such hope seems to have disappeared, as the decrease in expenditure was 
across-the-board. Moreover, road-related advertising (both for the company’s own road service and 
for road competition), suffered a significant blow. The effect of  the Depression receded from 1934, 
when advertising expenditure picked up again. The constant increase of  the expenditure on 
excursion advertising from 1933 until 1938 is especially conspicuous. In 1938, the level of  
expenditure on that item returned to 87 per cent of  the amount spent in 1929, while the expenditure 
on total traffic advertising recovered only to 81 per cent of  the 1929 level.  
The relative weight of  different items of  expenditure points to each company’s general 
marketing strategy. Promoting resorts, for the LNER, was of  secondary importance compared to 
advertising on ‘train services’, as some historians have noted (Ward, 1998, p. 49). The direct spending 
on resort promotion was, except for 1938, less than what was spent on overseas promotion. Resort 
promotion was usually conducted as a collaborative scheme in which a railway company paid 50% of  
the cost for promoting a specific resort on the premise that the local authority bore the equal amount 
(Railway Gazette, 1950, p. 507; LMS 1929a; GWR 1928). The Great Depression made the railway 
companies less eager to invest in this type of  resort promotion, a shift in attitude that was reflected in 
the LNER’s advertising accounts. As discussed above, international traffic was a major item of  
promotion, which was closely connected to the advertising of  waterborne service. Under this 
category, the largest spending, accounting for more than £10,000 each year between 1929 and 1938, 
was on the company’s steamboat service connecting English ports with Hook in Holland and 
Zeebrugge in Belgium. The relatively large sum spent on the steamboat service promotion was 
justified by the feeder traffic carrying passengers to and from the company’s territory. Similar logic 
applied to railway hotels. Although less extensive than the LMS’s Scottish hotel business, the LNER 
operated a number of  hotel establishments including the Sandringham Hotel at Hunstanton (Pope, 
2000, p. 63). Railway managers recognised that a successful hotel service could attract passenger 
business, which explained the fairly small but constant spending on hotel advertising. 
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Insert Table 1 About Here 
 
Table 1. LNER Advertising Expenditure, 1929–1938 
Source: TNA, RAIL 400/64–73 
 
The railways’ prioritisation of  discretionary travel is evident in a contemporary document of  
the comparative data of  the LMS and LNER advertising expenditure, which distinguishes three 
categories of  advertising—press, posters, and guidebooks—according to their target market. In 1928, 
LMS’s press advertising was both targeted at general traffic (43 per cent) and excursions and other 
reduced fares travel (57 per cent) while its guides, programmes, and handbills, as well as posters, were 
overwhelmingly aimed at the latter type of  travel (83 per cent for the first three and 82 per cent for 
the posters) (LMS, 1929a). This shows that, while press advertising promoted both types of  travel, 
other media were used chiefly to advertise excursions and reduced fares. 
 At any rate, the cost consideration was a significant factor in railway marketing, and it 
explains why the companies steered towards press advertising, publicity and public relations. Among 
others, free publicity became an important conduit of  information flow to supplement other 
marketing activities. For that purpose, the companies’ internal report often emphasised the 
importance of  maintaining ‘friendly relations with the Press’ (GWR, 1928). The LMS employed a 
publicity agent to secure free editorial references to the company, which in 1928 alone, brought in a 
total of  13,413 free announcements, which according to the company’s estimate, saved the company 
£73,771 (LMS, 1929a). A similar effort was made by the GWR, in which Maxwell Fraser of  the 
Publicity Department sent numerous contributions to newspapers (Wilson, 1970, p. 46). 
Cost-consciousness among the railway companies also helped, to some extent, to overcome 
long-standing rivalry among the railway companies, and, as a consequence, joint press advertising 
gradually became an established practice.  
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 The available evidence suggests that the railway companies were continuously adjusting 
their advertising expenditure, both the total amount and the allocation to different media, in view of  
improving the effectiveness and efficiency of  its promotional activities. Yet, considering that the 
railway companies came to use free publicity and public relations techniques as well as publicity 
media that were sold to potential customers, the examination of  expenditure needs to be regarded as 
showing just one aspect of  railway marketing. In other words, railway marketing during the interwar 
period became a more knowledge-based and less capital intensive endeavour than in the previous 
period: this further encouraged the coordination of  railway business in which scale economy in 
advertising could have achieved by joint marketing efforts. 
 
Marketing Alliance and the Birth of  the ‘British Railways’ 
The railways’ embracing of  public relations, and the shift to knowledge-based publicity, indicate the 
growing ‘image consciousness’ present among the railway companies, which went beyond individual 
company (Casson, 2009, p. 309). A forum to discuss various railway matters existed from the 1840s 
in the form of  the Railway Clearing House (RCH). The RCH was established in 1842 to facilitate 
inter-company financial transactions, especially those related to passenger travel across more than 
one company (‘through’ traffic). In the late nineteenth century, the organisation, under the aegis of  
the majority of  railway companies, rapidly expanded its operations, and came to cover wide-ranging 
operational and policy matters.  
The standardisation of  railway operation and commercial practice was largely achieved by 
coordination at the RCH, compensating for the operational difficulties stemming from the existence 
of  numerous privately-run railway companies. Supposedly, the need for RCH’s function in 
standardisation diminished after the grouping of  the railway companies in 1923. However, as 
Edwards has recently argued, the role of  the RCH was not so much diminished as changed, and in 
some areas, it was rather expanded (Edwards, 2008, pp. 1–2). Advertising, publicity and public 
relations were examples of  the changing role of  the RCH. From the 1860s to the 1900s, the railway 
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companies managed the amount of  advertising through the RCH’s Conference of  Superintendents 
and that of  Advertising Representatives. The RCH’s advertising oversight was abandoned in 1906 
when discord among the railway companies over advertising restrictions made some companies 
militate against the coordination process (Shin, 2014, pp. 200–201; RCH, 1907). After the First World 
War, the RCH meeting was revived, and the Big Four’s advertising officers again regularly met to 
discuss issues pertaining to marketing issues (RCH, 1919). 
The RCH Advertising Committee was widely regarded as the public front for the railway 
industry. The meeting regularly received various requests, solicitations, and information from diverse 
groups outside the railway industry. The railway companies dealing with the mass media also came to 
be coordinated by the RCH. In 1928, the RCH decided to include public relations in its remit and, 
accordingly, the committee was renamed as the Advertising and Public Relations Committee. At the 
same time, the Railways Information Bureau was renamed as the British Railways’ Press Bureau, 
which distributed the publicity materials of  the railway industry, being probably one of  the earliest 
examples of  a commercial industry issuing press releases (RCH, 1928; LNER, 1924b). From 1935, 
this arrangement was further institutionalised in the shape of  the RCH Press Sub-Committee. 
The railway companies’ close coordination of  publicity and public relations at the industry 
level showed that the railway industry was keeping steps with the growing trend of  product-based 
marketing alliances (Taylor, 1934, p. 28). The gas industry had an industry-wide publicity group in the 
form of  the British Commercial Gas Association, which was set up in 1912, and the electricity 
industry created the Electrical Development Association in 1919 (Darling, 2007, p. 139). Similarly, 
from the late 1920s, the large oil companies collaborated with each other on marketing, and from 
1933, the brewing industry started its Collective Advertising Campaign (Brown, 1993, p. 356; 
Gourvish, 1994, pp. 352–353). For its origin, the railway industry’s advertising coordination in the 
RCH, which started in the 1860s, was one of  the earliest. Just as the inter-firm competition in the 
later nineteenth century gave birth to an industry-wide coordination of  railway advertising, the 
inter-modal competition in the interwar period increased and strengthened the railway industry’s 
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marketing alliance.  
The RCH Advertising Committee did not directly influence the advertising policies of  
individual companies, but instead concentrated on arranging joint publicity efforts (Orton, 1936, p. 
33). The four companies issued joint-advertisements, which, at first, had four names, though later 
they started to use the identifier ‘British Railways’. Also, the railway companies’ began to make 
collaborative efforts in trade fares and exhibitions, usually coordinated by the RCH committee. In 
one of  their earliest joint enterprises in 1927, the railway companies participated in the Olympia 
Advertising Exhibition as the ‘British Railways’ (Figure 3) (GWR, 1927, pp. 318–320). 
Thenceforward, joint publicity became a visible trend. In addition, the introduction of  new service 
products came to be coordinated to some extent. For example, the highly successful ‘summer ticket’ 
was introduced in 1933 by all the Big Four, showing that the railway companies’ joint marketing now 
extended to product introduction (LMS, 1934; LMS, 1946, p. 17).  
  
 
Insert Figure 3 About Here 
 
Figure 3. “British Railways” at Advertising Exhibition, Olympia 
Source: GWR Magazine (1927), p. 318 
 
The joint sales activities were also apparent in the overseas activities of  Britain’s railways. The 
Big Four had operated overseas offices, mostly to promote international tourism, since as early as 
1907 (RCH, 1926; British Transport Commission, 1957; GWR, 1907; Smith, 1988, p. 157). By the late 
1920s, for example, the LMS had established offices in Paris, Brussels, Antwerp, St Malo and the 
Channel Islands, as well as a number of  agents throughout Europe, the US and Canada. Overseas 
offices of  the individual companies often worked together, and in some cases, like the Associated 
British Railways Inc., even merged their activities (GWR, 1929b). Around the time of  the Olympia 
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Exhibition in 1927, the RCH’s advertising committee expressed the need to ‘sink the individuality’ for 
advertising in the United States. It was based on this collaborative ethos that the US office of  the 
Associated British Railways Inc. was established in 1934. The ‘Come to Britain’ movement was 
formed around the same time, which was no coincidence (Beckerson, 2003, p. 112; Day, 1981, pp. 
90–93; Ward, 1998, pp. 46–47). This movement started in 1926 as the initiative of  Sir Francis Towle 
of  Gordon otels who was a son of  the former catering manager of  the Midland Railway, one of  
the predecessors of  the LMS (Advisory Committee to the Department of  Overseas Trade, n.d.; The 
Times, 1926). The involvement of  the railway companies in this international tourism promotion was 
apparent from the earliest stage. When the Travel Association of  Britain took over the movement in 
1929, the GWR’s General Manager Felix Pole was among its six provisional committee members 
(Taylor, 1981, p. 94; Wilson, 1970, p. 34).  
 
Insert Figure 4 About Here 
 
Figure 4. British Railway Office, designed by H. T. Cadbury Brown, 1936 
Source: Royal Institute of  British Architects (RIBA) Collections, SD59/3 
 
The British Railways, in the form of  a collective service brand of  the four railway companies, 
came into existence in the domestic travel market in the 1930s. An example of  the railway companies’ 
collective branding was the ‘British Railways’ ticket offices (Dandridge, 1938, pp. 236–237). Each of  
the Big Four had, by the interwar period, developed a network of  ticket sales offices. In 1935, the 
GWR’s list of  ticket sales points—excluding railway stations—referred to at least 269 of  them, 
including three British Railway Offices (GWR, 1935). In 1936, the railway companies, along with the 
Royal Institute of  British Architects, held a competition for the architectural design of  railway offices 
in London, with H. T. Cadbury-Brown’s design winning first place (Figure 4) (RIBA, 1936, pp. 60, 
107). The new, standard design was to be implemented in 71 railway offices across London, of  which 
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at least two were actually built (in Queensway and the Strand) before the Second World War 
(Dandridge, 1938, p. 237; The Times, 1939). The modernist style of  the British Railways office, 
designed along simple lines which matched the British Railways’ logo in Sans Serif, anticipated the 
office design of  the 1960s, making it a striking contrast with cluttered station ticket offices or 
shop-style town offices of  the previous period. The inter-availability of  tickets had already been 
achieved before the establishment of  the British Railways’ office, but the joint sales office, with a 
standardised design, was well beyond simple joint sales. The marketing alliances of  the Big Four were 
thus anything but an ad-hoc publicity arrangement: rather, it was an eloquent testimony to the height 
that the railways’ marketing had reached in the late 1930s. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper’s examination of  the marketing organisation of  the Big Four railway companies reveals 
that Britain’s mainline railway companies had developed a highly sophisticated marketing machinery 
by the 1930s. All the four companies had internal departments that were led by expert marketers who 
often came from outside the railway industry. Railway marketing benefitted from a growing pool of  
marketing experts and their specialised knowledge. The companies also invested a substantial amount 
of  financial resources in their marketing activity, and, at the same time, carefully managed 
expenditure in view of  the broader business conditions. Far from being an industry without a 
marketing strategy, the Big Four companies from the mid-1920s were at the forefront of  service 
marketing development. Contemporary marketing professionals generally regarded railway marketers 
as seasoned experts in the art of  advertising. Tom Purvis, the well-established commercial poster 
artist, described LNER’s William Teasdale and C. G. Dandridge as ‘two of  the most appreciated and 
sympathetic men it has been any artist’s delight to work for… stand out to me as shining examples of  
artists in commerce’ (Purvis, 1930, p. 12). In contrast, Purvis regarded Jack Beddington of  Shell ‘a 
comparative newcomer to advertising’. In interwar Britain’s marketing world, railway companies 
undoubtedly had a conspicuous presence. 
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Insert Figure 5, 6, 7 and 8 About Here 
 
Figure 5. LNER, “Dine Well by LNER” by Tom Purvis, 1935 
Source: NRM 1978-8940, ©Science & Society Picture Library 
 
Figure 6. SR, “Hike for Health”, printed by The Baynard Press, c.1930 
Source: NRM 1996-7432, ©Science & Society Picture Library 
 
Figure 7. LNER, “East Coast Joys” by Tom Purvis, 1932 
Source: NRM 1978-9362, ©Science & Society Picture Library 
 
Figure 8. GWR/LMS/LNER/SR, “Take Your Dog”, by Mabel Gear, c.1935 
Source: NRM 1978-9637, ©Science & Society Picture Library 
 
 
As a number of  cultural historians have demonstrated that railway art flourished during the 
interwar period (Cole and Durack, 1992; Hewitt, 1995 and 2000; Watts, 2004). By the 1920s, railway 
posters had become an established form of  commercial art, and the inter-firm and inter-modal 
competition of  the time stimulated its further development. In 1924, the advertising consultant 
Thomas Russell noted that railway advertising featuring ‘a locomotive’ belonged to the generation of  
‘our grandfathers’, and modern advertising should focus on ‘not the product but the service it gives’ 
(Russell, 1924, p. 550). Although locomotives still appeared in railway posters, especially when 
express trains were being promoted, the focus of  railway posters in the interwar years was less on 
brute mechanical speed than on the smooth riding of  the train embedded within Britain’s natural 
landscape (Shin and Divall, 2011). Generally speaking, railway posters kept up with—and in some 
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cases led the way in—the contemporary development of  commercial art. Travelling experience was 
depicted not just as comfortable but also as glamorous and luxurious, as shown in the LNER’s 1935 
poster promoting restaurant cars (Robinson-Tomsett, 2016, pp. 50–53). In this poster by Tom Purvis, 
a lady in a modern dress enjoys a cigarette and a cup of  coffee at the dining table—a scene that could 
just as well have been set in an up-market restaurant in London rather than in a train carriage (Figure 
5). Travel destinations remained a favourite theme of  posters, but an increasing number of  posters 
featured generic scenery of  the seaside or countryside and were concerned less with the peculiar 
quality of  the place than with the activities one could enjoy at the destination, like swimming, hiking, 
golfing and shopping. (Figure 6) The images of  playing children frequently appeared in posters and 
guidebooks, targeting family holiday makers by appealing to the parents’ sense of  duty to their 
children (Figure 7; Medcalf, 2011). While the themes in poster illustration diversified, the format of  
railway posters became increasingly standardised within a company, with company logos and fonts 
expressing brand identity, distinguishing one company from another (Hewitt p. 298; Cole and Durack, 
1992, p. 17). In the 1930s, however, in line with the marketing alliance in the railway industry, 
collective advertising by the Big Four companies became a new trend, promoting overseas travel and 
introducing new services such as household removals, cash on delivery services and discounted 
return tickets for dogs (Figure 8). Railway posters thus reflected the wider development in the railway 
industry’s marketing strategy and organisation. 
 The series of  re-organisations in the Big Four’s marketing departments in the late 1920s 
showed that railway marketing did not stand still, but evolved in order to adjust to the changing 
business situation. The adoption of  market research and closer collaboration between companies 
through the RCH were clear testimony that Britain’s railways embraced modern marketing ideas. 
Simultaneously, the timing of  the re-organisation is suggestive of  the underlying business rationale 
for the Big Four’s revision and expansion of  their marketing departments. The late 1920s were the 
time when the main line companies came to the realisation that rail travel was losing out to rapidly 
developing road traffic. The railways’ chief  competitor was the motorbus, but private cars were also 
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eroding the Big Four’s customer base. Railway managers were by no means optimistic about the 
future of  rail travel. In 1928, the GWR Traffic Department noted that ‘the consistent and rapid 
growth in the number of  private cars is a serious menace to the railway companies and there is little 
to be done to attract this class of  traffic’ (GWR, 1928). Railway marketing was accompanied by the 
sense of  decline in the rail business. The marketing strategy centred around reduced fare 
travel—criticised by some historians and commentators as an imprudent business decision that 
would contribute to a dilution of  passenger revenue—made more sense as the railways’ rear-guard 
battle against road competition rather than expansionary business tactics (Aldcroft, 1968, pp. 61–63; ; 
Fenelon, 1939, p. 139; Butterfield, 1986, p. 35). 
 The degree to which railway marketing worked to improve the industry’s performance in 
the inter-modal competition requires further examination. What is clear from this paper’s review of  
railway marketing is that a plausible assessment of  railways’ passenger business in interwar Britain 
needs to incorporate the railway companies’ marketing strategy. Marketing played a pivotal role in the 
railways’ commercial policy such as promoting reduced fares, introducing new facilities and enticing 
people to travel. It is also important to give equal attention to the successes and failures of  railway 
marketing. The Big Four’s marketing might have contributed to the arrest or slowdown of  the decline 
of  their passenger business, but there is also the possibility that the companies could improve their 
business conditions by investing more in, for example, expanding high-speed service, better 
point-to-point connection or standard fare travel. After all, an evaluation of  railway marketing should 
be linked with the railways’ business performance. However, the decline of  railways’ passenger 
business cannot be attributed to the absence of  marketing strategy—rather, the decline occurred 
despite the fairly advanced state of  railway marketing. By acknowledging the place of  marketing in the 
railway business, we would begin to understand how the golden age of  railway advertising coincided 
with the commercial failure of  the railways’ passenger business in interwar Britain. 
 
Notes 
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1. The railway industry’s passenger returns were divided into full-fare and reduced fares. The 
four main categories of reduced fares were excursion tickets, workmen’s tickets, season tickets 
and tourist tickets. Tourist tickets were originally sold only during summer holiday season, 
but in the early 1930s, their sales period was eventually extended to all year. Around the 
same time, the variety of excursion tickets expanded to include discount tickets on special 
excursion trains (serving tourist destinations like pleasure and health resorts and special 
events like race meetings, football matches and Christmas shopping), day, half-day, weekend, 
period and monthly return tickets on both short and long-distance routes. Effectively, 
excursion tickets became a category that covered various types of reduced price tickets. 
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  1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
1938 
(1929=1.00) 
Publications 38,262 35,261 23,434 23,950 22,881 23,207 23,939 23,299 23,222 25,989 0.68 
Press 21,360 25,145 12,631 14,570 12,133 13,178 13,933 11,525 11,400 10,995 0.51 
Resorts 17,630 19,546 16,113 14,558 10,365 11,765 10,991 10,937 11,765 13,545 0.77 
Train Services 37,093 34,322 26,421 24,688 24,223 25,869 26,712 26,051 32,611 31,356 0.85 
Posters and Bills 19,999 16,181 13,863 14,899 12,644 13,207 12,665 14,519 15,729 14,671 0.73 
Excursion 120,288 100,040 79,740 75,815 80,100 85,802 93,308 98,237 103,403 104,553 0.87 
Overseas 21,504 21,656 21,049 20,693 15,889 18,750 16,781 14,472 11,883 13,183 0.61 
Sea, Canal, Docks etc. 21,491 23,079 19,500 14,470 14,475 16,699 13,977 13,767 14,830 13,317 0.62 
Hotels 4,008 3,185 3,881 4,236 3,734 3,697 4,539 3,877 3,646 4,414 1.10 
Office Expenses and 
Salary 31,947 32,402 30,488 29,706 29,410 29,287 29,952 30,546 30,432 31,364 0.98 
Road 9,915 5,085 2,603 2,107 2,092 2,065 2,130 1,820 1,760 1,068 0.11 
Goods Department 1,476 1,182 1,116 1,420 992 1,411 1,704 3,474 2,550 5,159 3.50 
Others 7,559 7,976 5,142 6,236 6,215 6,280 7,307 7,087 8,168 13,370 1.77 
Total 352,532 325,060 255,981 247,348 235,153 251,217 257,938 259,611 271,399 282,984 0.80 
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Figure 1. Big Four Passenger Revenue, 1924–1938  
Source: TNA, RAIL 398/42–55  
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Figure 2. Big Four Passenger Receipts by Ticket Type, 1923–1937  
Source: Railway Returns, various years  
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Figure 3. “British Railways” at Advertising Exhibition, Olympia  
Source: GWR Magazine (1927), p. 318  
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Figure 4. British Railway Office, designed by H. T. Cadbury Brown, 1936  
Source: Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) Collections, SD59/3  
 
207x141mm (150 x 150 DPI)  
 
 
Page 40 of 44Journal of Historical Research in Marketing
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Historical Research in Marketing
  
 
 
Figure 5. LNER, “Dine Well by LNER” by Tom Purvis, 1935  
Source: NRM 1978-8940, ©Science & Society Picture Library  
 
233x184mm (150 x 150 DPI)  
 
 
Page 41 of 44 Journal of Historical Research in Marketing
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Historical Research in Marketing
  
 
 
Figure 6. SR, “Hike for Health”, printed by The Baynard Press, c.1930  
Source: NRM 1996-7432, ©Science & Society Picture Library  
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Figure 7. LNER, “East Coast Joys” by Tom Purvis, 1932  
Source: NRM 1978-9362, ©Science & Society Picture Library  
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Figure 8. GWR/LMS/LNER/SR, “Take Your Dog”, by Mabel Gear, c.1935  
Source: NRM 1978-9637, ©Science & Society Picture Library  
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